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THE POWER OF THE STATE TO TAX WHERE
THE INCIDENCE FALLS UPON THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
WILLIAM G. CLARK
N THE 1930's the Great Depression, with its widely endemic wake
of unemployment, increased both the States' needs for additional
funds, with which to alleviate the burdens of immediate poverty,
and diminished the sources of revenue that would otherwise have pro-
vided these funds.
Therefore, during the early years of the fourth decade of the
Twentieth Century, many States, including Illinois, imposed taxes
measured by the gross receipts from the sales of personal property.
Because of the varying provisions of the constitutions of the several
States which grant or limit the States' taxing power, because of the
variant legal conceptions underlying State taxes, and, partly perhaps,
because of the variant tastes on the part of the authors of the various
State taxing acts, the juristic concepts uttered in these various State
taxing laws differed in this respect: Some of the State taxing measures
conceived the tax as being laid upon the ultimate consumer, the mer-
chant being regarded as the State's taxing collector in invitum. Other
State taxing measures conceived the tax as being laid in legal contem-
plation directly and ultimately upon the vendor, even though the eco-
nomic burden of the tax fell upon the purchaser.
But regardless of whether the State tax was considered as being laid
upon the ultimate purchaser, with the vendor being the State's tax col-
lector, or directly upon the vendor, there arose a widespread practice
of adding the approximate amount of the tax (e.g., three cents per
dollar) to the price of the merchandise.
Illinois' taxes measured by gross receipts from sales of merchandise
exemplified each of these concepts. Illinois' Motor Fuel Tax Act' has
always been regarded as being laid not upon the vendor of gasoline,
but upon the purchaser for the privilege of driving upon public high-
ways. The retail vendor, usually the proprietor of a filling station, is
regarded not as a taxpayer, but as a tax collector, impressed into the
I ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 417-434 (1961).
Attorney General, State of Illinois, LL.B., DePaul University, 1947.
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State's service on the theory that if he desires to sell gasoline for use
and consumption in driving over Illinois' highways, he must serve as
the State's uncompensated tax gatherer.2
But the first Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Act was held un-
constitutional in Winter v. Barrett3 because it exempted from its reach
farmers and truck gardeners who sold foodstuffs produced by them
directly to the ultimate consumer at retail. The second Illinois Retail-
ers' Occupation Tax Act, which was held constitutional in Reif v.
Barrett4 and is still in effect with numerous amendments, conceives the
tax as being laid upon the retail merchant and not upon his consumer.'
The Illinois' Use Tax Act6 which was held constitutional as com-
plementing and implementing the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act,
conceives the tax as being laid upon the purchaser, and in effect makes
the merchant (at least where the goods are purchased in Illinois) the
State's tax gatherer.7
This discussion is not concerned with the general scope, extent and
reach of the States' power to impose taxes measured by a flat rate
upon gross receipts in general. Rather, it is confined to the particular
class of cases that arise where, although the tax is laid in juristic form
upon the vendor, it is in economic reality borne by the Federal Gov-
ernment.
Prior to 1941 it was contended that at least in cases where the
amount of the tax (e.g., three cents per dollar) was in fiscal actuality
borne by the Federal Government as a separate charge, the tax was in
ultimate reality laid upon the Federal Government and was unconsti-
tutional for that reason.
But in 1941 the Supreme Court of the United States held contra in
Alabama v. King & Boozer.' There the defendant contended that an
otherwise constitutional tax laid by Alabama on vendors of personal
property and measured by gross receipts infringed federal sovereignty
because the tax was levied on contractors who used the property in
"People v. Deep Rock Oil Co,, 343 111. 388, 175 N.I-. 572 (1931).
3 352 I1. 441, 186 N.E. 113 (1933).
4 355 Ill. 104, 188 N.E. 889 (1933).
5 People's Drug Shop, Inc. v. Moysey, 384 I1l. 283, 51 N.E. 2d 144 (1943).
6 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 439.1-439.22 (1961).
7 Turner v. Wright, 11 111. 2d 161, 142 N.E. 2d 84 (1957) (appeal dismissed for
want of substantial federal question, 355 U.S. 65 [1957]).
8314 U.S. 1 (1948).
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the performance of contracts with the United States. The Court de-
cided that the tax was constitutional, even though the United States
absorbed and bore the economic burden of the tax under "cost-plus
contracts."
From 1941 to the late 1950's the decisions of the Supreme Court
appear to have recognized that the interplay of Federal and State taxa-
tion was based upon the right of the States to impose otherwise per-
missible taxes measured by gross receipts in cases where the Federal
Government bore the actual economic burden of the tax. In Phillips
Chem. Co. v. Dumas School District9 the facts were these: Texas levied
an ad valorem tax with respect to leasehold estates in lands. The tax
was imposed annually upon the lessee but was measured by the value
of the property, not to the lessee, but to the lessor. The statute fixed a
lower tax base if the lessor was the State of Texas or one of its agen-
cies. The United States had temporarily leased surplus land to Phillips
Chemical Company, a private corporation organized and operated for
profit. The Supreme Court of the United States held that even though
Phillips Chemical Company might be taxed on the value of the prop-
erty demised to the United States, the tax rate was higher than it
would have been had the property been leased to the State of Texas:
therefore the tax discriminated against the United States, infringed
federal sovereignty and was unconstitutional.
In United States v. Livingston"0 a three judge district court held
that where property owned by the DuPont Corporation was leased
to the United States for one dollar a year and was exploited without
profit to DuPont for important defense research, a tax upon this prop-
erty during this period was in reality a tax on the United States, even
though it was imposed upon DuPont, where the Federal Government
reimbursed DuPont ad item for this tax. The tax was therefore held
invalid.
Thereupon the United States asserted, at least sporadically, that any
state tax measured by gross receipts was unconstitutional where the
full burden of the tax was borne in economic reality, if not in imme-
diate form, by the Federal Government."'
In 1953, the General Assembly of Illinois amended Section 2 of the
9 361 U.S. 376 (1960).
10 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959), aff'd, 364 U.S. 281 (1960).
11 Ibid.
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Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Act 12 to exempt from the measure
of the tax:
The .proceeds of such sales to the State of Illinois, any county, political sub-
division or municipality thereof, or to any instrumentality or institution of any
of the governmental units aforesaid, and excluding the proceeds of such sales
to any corporation, society, association, foundation, or institution organized
and operated exclusively for charitable, religious or educational purposes.' 8 .
After the effective date of this 1953 Amendment, July 1, 1953, Illi-
nois continued to impose and the retailers continued to pay Illinois
Retailers' Occupation Taxes that would otherwise be due, including
taxes on sales made to the United States Government under contracts
in which the contractors were specifically reimbursed ad item for the
Illinois Retailers' Occupation Taxes computed and paid by Illinois
vendors.
However on August 29, 1960, the United States and Olin Mathie-
son Chemical Corporation, a private corporate entrepreneur organ-
ized under the laws of the State of Virginia, filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois relying
upon the decisions in Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas School District4
and Livingston v. United States.'5 Plaintiffs contended that inasmuch
as Illinois exempted from its tax sales to the State, its instrumentalities,
municipal corporations and charities, the continued exaction of the
tax from Illinois retailers who sell to the United States and parties who
have contracts with the United States discriminated against the Fed-
eral Government and infringed federal sovereignty.
A bench of three judges sitting en bane, under section 1253 of the
Judicial Code,16 held in United States v. Department of Revenue17
that Illinois' 1953 exemptive provisions" invidiously discriminated
against the Federal Government. Thereafter the United States and
Olin Mathieson Company amended their complaint to assert a cate-
gorical immunity from the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax with
respect to all sales to the Federal Government or its contractors.
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441 (1953).
13 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 441 (1959).
14 361 U.S. 376 (1960).
15 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D.S.C. 1959), aff'd, 364 U.S. 281 (1960).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1948).
'7 191 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. I11. 1960).
18 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, §441 (1953).
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Confronted by this pronouncement by the District Court, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois held in the People ex rel. Holland Coal Co. v.
lsaacs," that the 1953 Amendment to the Illinois Retailers' Occupa-
tion Tax Act which exempted from the reach of the tax sales to Illi-
nois, its counties, municipalities and other agencies, was an uncon-
stitutional discrimination against the Federal Government; that the
General Assembly would not have enacted that Amendment if it had
been aware that it discriminated against national sovereignty; and that
it was therefore void. But the Court also held that the exemption of
private charities did not discriminate against the Federal Government.
In the light of the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Holland
Coal Company, the Supreme Court of the United States vacated the
District Court's judgment in United States v. Department of Reve-
nue20 noted above, and remanded the case for further proceedings.2z
On remand the District Court acceded to the holding of the Illinois
Supreme Court in Holland Coal Company, and held that Illinois may
continue to levy otherwise permissible Retailers' Occupation Taxes
against Illinois vendors, even though the amounts of those taxes are
borne specifically ad item by the Federal Government, so long as Illi-
nois does not exempt similar sales to itself, its instrumentalities or mu-
nicipal corporations, although it does exempt sales to private charities.22
Since the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the District
Court without opinion,28 this note seems appropriate as an explanation
of the actual holding in United States v. Department of Revenue24
where the Court held that Alabama v. King & Boozer,25 is still the law
of the land and the several States may continue to replenish their
revenues by otherwise permissible taxes laid in terms upon vendors
even though the amounts of such taxes are borne specifically and ad
item by the Federal Government, so long as the State does not exempt
from the reach of the tax similar sales made to itself or its public
instrumentalities.
19 22 Ill. 2d 477, 176 N.E. 2d 889 (1961).
20 191 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Il1. 1960).
21 Department of Revenue v. United States, 368 U.S. 30 (1960).
22 United States v. Department of Revenue, 202 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) (one
judge dissenting).
23 371 U.S. 21 (1962).
24 202 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. 111. 1962).
2 314 U.S. 1 (1948).
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